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Introduction
Since the end of the Second World War, Japan's security policy has been
uniquely pacifist and impressively stable, but not stagnant. Gradual changes have
been occurring. There are many facets behind Japanese security policy: national
interests, diplomatic pressure fi'om the United States (gaiatsu), constitutional
constraints on the military brought on by Article IX of the constitution and in
recent years, regional security threats, and the emergence of a functional two-

party political system. Overall, Japan has been able to maintain the country's
pacifist values during the post-war period, concentrating on democracy and
economic success because of their reliance on the United States for its defense.

But this accepted norm for Japan has begun to clash with the changing
international and regional situation, challenging Japan's culture of anti-militarism
and leading to much speculation about the direction Japan is heading.
Central to the debate over Japan's security policy has been the notion of a
'normal' Japan. The term was introduced and popularized by former Chief
Secretary of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP), founder of the Liberal
Party and later, former President of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), ichiro
Ozawa in his 1993 book, Bhteprint for a New Japan: the Rethinking of a Nation
ihon Kaizou Keikaku).1 For Ozawa, a 'normal' Japan meant a country

contributing to the regional and global security by actively participating in
international peacekeeping activities under the auspices of the United Nations.
However, this definition has not necessarily been the standard and Soeya,
Tadokoro and Welch illustrate the different definitions that various neighboring

I Ichiro Ozawa, Nihon Kaizolt Keikaklt (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993)

countries have of what a 'normal' Japan means to themf Hiro Katsumata and

MingjiangLi also contribute to this dialogue by arguing that 'normalization' is
synonymous to 'militarization' to sceptics, specifically the Chinese, in their
article, but not to the Japanese.3 They argue that the discourse of Japan as a
'normal' state developed on the basis of Ozawa's thesis, with the key point being
international peacekeeping activities and constitutional change. Hugo Dobson
presents a perspective on this matter through UN peacekeeping operations;
Japan's policy towards UN peacekeeping operations but also the apprehension of
Southeast Asian and Far East Asian states of an active and expanded Japanese role
in peacekeeping operations.4 Dobson approaches Japan's peacekeeping policy
from the viewpoints of several norms and ultimately identifies peacekeeping
operations as the norm that transcends all others.

The LDP, with a center-right political position and an unwavering
supporter of the U.S.-Japan alliance, dominated Japanese politics for nearly half a
century. Under LDP leaders such as Junichir6 Koizumi and ShinzO Abe, the
alliance grew stronger while their stance towards their Asian neighbors was often
harsh and unyielding. Then in 2009, the DPJ, in an unprecedented victory, rose to
power, promising to improve relations with their Asian neighbors and placing less
emphasis on the United Statesf As a political party, the DPJ was established in
1998 with a merging of a mixed bag of smaller parties. Most notably, Ozawa
Ichiro folded his party with the DPJ in 2003. The DPJ's presence has been

2 Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro and David A. Welch, editors, Japan as a Nolvnal
CounOy? A Nation in Sealvh of its Place in the World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,

2011).
3 Hiro Katusmata and Mingjiang Li, "China Wary of a 'Normal' Japan," Asia Times
http://www.atimes.eom/printN.html, accessed Feb. 10, 2013).
4 Hugo Dobson, Japan and UnitedNations Peacekeeping: New Pressure, New Responses (London
& NY: Routledge Curzon, 2003).
5 "Watashi tachi no kohon rinen" (Our Basic Principles), DPJ website,

http:/Aÿv.dpi.or.]p/about/dpi/principles1998, accessed May 5, 2013).
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increasing in both the Upper and Lower Houses since their establishment in 1998
and gained growing public support by criticizing the LDP for their lock step
support in the U.S.-led war in h'aq. In August of 2007, the DPJ managed to take
control of the Upper House and in the general election of 2009, toppled the
political party that monopolized Japanese government for over half a century.
There were major domestic and global developments prior to the DPJ's rise to
power in 2009. The mismanaged pension program, corruption scandals involving
cabinet ministers, the unpopular health care along with high oil prices and the
international financial crises were all problems under the LDP and the DPJ
managed to win big when the Japanese public were disillusioned with the way the
country was being led. They won 308 seats out of 480 seats, compared to 199 for
the LDP, a no-contest victory for the DPJ.6

The DPJ's pre-election positioning on security and foreign policy were
evidently different from that of the LDP's. The DPJ consistently criticized the
LDP's unwavering support and strong emphasis on the U.S.-Japan alliance and

expressed the need to become more "independent" (jiritsu teki na gaikou) of the
United States and work closer with its Asian neighbors and the United Nations]
Working with its Asian neighbors was nothing new for Japan but pledging to
strengthen it was meant to differentiate itself from the close alliance the LDP
formed with the U.S., especially during Koizumi's administration. The DPJ
position on the Anti-Terrorisln Special Measures Law (ATSML), a 2001 law that
broadened the definition of Japan's self-defense, allowing Japan to support the

6 "Kaihyokekka ichiran 2009 sousenlg,o," (2009 general election results) Asahi Shimbun, accessed

May 21, 2013, http://asahi.com/senkyo2009/kaihyo/.
7 "Watashi tachi no Idhon rinen" (01#' Basic Principles), DPJ website,

http://www.dpi.or.ip/about/dpi/principles 1998.

U.S. military on foreign territoryS; the U.S. base realignment issue, especially

involving the U.S. military base in Okinawa; the dispatching of the Japan Special
Defense Forces (JSDF) all initially set them apart from the LDP position.9
However as the DPJ moved fi'om campaigning to governing, their positions on
these and other issues began to converge with their predecessors.
Easley, Kotani, and Mori argue that the main reason for Japan's foreign

policy stability is due to the same political party having controlled the government
for nearly the entire post-war era. They argue that, "One party dominance in Japan
has insulated the country's foreign relations fi'om inter-party difference." 10 But

was the DPJ, the only party since 1955 to take over the government from the LDP
in reality able to alter the security, defense and foreign policies in a distinctly
different way fi'Oln their veteran predecessors in the short three years and three
months they were in power? In this thesis, I argue that despite the emphasis made
by the DPJ for change and a promise for a foreign policy that put more emphasis
on Asia and less on the United States, the result was of political change without
nmch policy change. This thesis attempts to detail the rise and fall of the DPJ,
noting the various promises made regarding security policy and the reasons why
they resulted in the pursuit of policies similar to the LDP's in practice. I will also
detail the various definitions of what a 'normal' Japan may be and argue that
Japan has gradually and steadily adjusted its posture towards change in

8 Canon Pence, "Reform in the Rising Sun: Koizumi's Bid to Revise Japan's Pacifist Constitution,"
Journal of international Law and Commercial Regulation 32 (2006): 335-89.
9 The JSDF (jietai) are unified military forces if Japan that was established after U.S. occupation of
Japan. For most of the post war period the JSDF was confined to the islands of Japan and not
permitted to be deployed abroad.
10 Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani and Aki Mori, "Electing a New Japanese Secm'iO, Policy?
Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democratic Party of Japan, "Asia Policy Number 9

(2010): 3.

international security through increased participation in peacekeeping missions,
adhering very closely to Ozawa's definition of a 'normal' Japan.

Chapter I.
Japan's Rise to Militarism
Anti-nuclear and anti-militaristic attitudes have defined Japan for most of
the post-war era and is rooted in the experience of the atomic bombings in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and subsequently in the support for Article IX of the
Japanese Constitution. However, militarisna in Japan rose much before the Second

World War. It is important to understand the history behind Japan's rise in
militarism first. From the Meiji period through the early part of the 20th century,
Japan was involved in a series of wars and conflicts as it sought to expand its
sphere of influence in Asia. The Imperial Japanese Army was established in 1873
and before the death of Emperor Meiji in 1912, it had engaged in the SinoJapanese War (1894-1895), invaded and occupied Taiwan (1895), engaged in the
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and annexed Korea in 1910.
Then followed a period of relative cahn under the reign of Emperor Taisho
(1912-1926), during which time political power shifted fi'om the oligarch clique
(genro) to the parliament and the democratic parties. Militarily, Japan joined the
Allied powers during World War One but played only a minor role fighting
German colonial forces in East Asia. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919,
Japan sought to amend a 'racial equality clause'lÿ to the covenant of the League of
Nations at the Paris Conference but this was rejected by the United Sates, Britain
and Australia. Arrogance and racial discrimination towards the Japanese that had
marked Japanese- Western relations since the forced opening of the country on

l l Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial EquafiO, Proposal of 1919 (London:

Rout|edge, 1998), 170.

March 31, 1854 was a factor in the deterioration of relations between the two
leading up to World War II.12
Japan suffered increasing economic problems after World War One. The
Great KantO Earthquake of 1923 and the Great Depression triggered by the 1929
stock market crash worsened the crisis. As an island nation Japan had few natural
resources and relied heavily on foreign trade. Import duties rose drastically as
Western industrialized countries cut back on the purchase of raw materials. The

Great Depression directly contributed to the rise in dictatorship, communism,
fascism and militarism around the world, hi Japan, militarists took control and in
an effort to relieve the effects of the Depression, the Japanese military conquered
Manchuria in 1931, a region rich in raw materials. Another significant reason for
Japan's invasion of Manchuria was to strengthen their strategic position in the
region. Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japanese leaders decided to
modernize the country along western lines and not only did this process consist of
political and economic reform but had a substantial military component. Japan,
being an early victim of imperialism decided to emulate it instead of turning
against the practice, carving out a substantial empire following their victory in the
Russo-Japanese War. The Japanese military argued that it needed to control
Manchuria as a security against a possible attack from the Red Army.
The Manchurian Incident transpired in 1931. Following the example of
other Western nations, Japan forced China into unequal economical and political
treaties. By this time, its influence over Manchuria steadily grew since the end of
the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. When the Chinese Nationalists began to
seriously challenge Japan's position in Manchuria in 1931, the Kwantung Army

12 Elise K. Tipton, Second Edition Modern Japan, A Social and Political Histoly (New York:
Routledge, 2008). 127.
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occupied Manchuria. The following year, Manchulcuo was declared an
independent state, controlled by the Kwantung Army though a puppet
government.13 In the same year, the Japanese air force bombarded Shanghai in
order to protect Japanese residents from anti-Japanese movements.
Outrage by the international community over Japan's actions in Manchuria

prompted Japan to leave the League of Nations in 1933. In July 1937 the Second
Sino-Japanese War broke out. Although the two countries had fought
intermittently since 1931, full fledged war began in 1937. The war was a
cuhnination of a decade-long Japanese imperialist policy aiming to dominate
China politically and militarily, and to secure its vast raw material reserves and
other economic resources. A small incident was soon made into a full-scale war

by the Kwantung army. The Japanese forces succeeded in occupying almost the
whole coast of China and COlmnitted severe war atrocities on the Chinese
population, especially during the fall of Nanking. However, the Chinese
government never surrendered completely, and the war continued until September
2, 1945, when representatives of Japan signed the Instruments of Surrender on

board USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay.14 In 1940 Japan occupied French Indochina
upon agreement with the French Vichy government and joined the Axis powers.
These actions intensified Japan's conflict with the United States and Great Britain,
who reacted with an oil boycott. Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an executive order

on July 26, 1941 and froze all of Japan's U.S. assets and embargoed all oil exports
to Japan, cutting Japan off fi'om 93% of its oil supply]5 The resulting oil shortage

13 Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchm'ia, 1904-1932 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2001).
14 "Japan Slo'renclers", National Archives and Records Administration,
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/iapanese surrender document/
15 Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ameriea's EnOy into World
War !!(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 134.

and failures to solve the conflict diplomatically made Japan decide to capture the
oil rich Dutch East Indies, crucial for the Japanese war effort. The Allies
attempted unsuccessfully to defend the islands and in January of 1942 the
Japanese forces invaded the islands. The Japanese planned to eliminate the U.S
Pacific Fleet, which would allow them to occupy the East Indies without
American interference. This was one factor that influenced the decision to attack

Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, drawing the United States into the Second
World War.16 Elsewhere, Japan was able to expand its control over a large

territory that expanded to the border of India in the West and New Guinea in the
South by early 1942.
The turning point in the Pacific War for Japan, however, came in June
1942 with the battle of Midway against the United States. The U.S. effectively
destroyed Japan's naval strength and Japan never recovered after that. From then

on, the Allied forces slowly won back the territories occupied by Japan, forcing
Japan on the defensive path moving forward. In 1944 air raids were waged over
Japan and intensified during the last months of the war. The attacks, initially
targeting industrial facilities soon were directed against urban areas. On April 1,
1945 U.S. forces invaded Okinawa to use as a base for air operations on the

planned invasion of the Japanese mainland. On July 27, 1945 the Allied powers
requested Japan in the Potsdam Declaration to surrender unconditionally in order
to prevent further destruction. However, the military did not consider surrendering
under such terms, even after Hiroshima and Nagasaki suffered massive atomic

bombings conducted by the U.S. on August 6 and 9, respectively. On August 15,
1945 Emperor Hirohito finally announced Japan's unconditional surrender.

26 Paul Reynolds, "Oil and Conflict - A Natural Mix," BBC News, April 20, 2004, accessed
February 28, 2009, www.news.bbc.o.uk/2/hi/3625207.stm.
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Chapter II.
The Culture of Anti-Militarism and the Normalization Debate
Following the surrender of Japan and the end of the Second World War,
the United Sates occupied Japan from 1945-1952. During this time the Japanese
constitution was drafted by U.S. Occupation officials and adopted by the Japanese
legislature in 1946. The Japanese Constitution is often referred to as the "Peace
Constitution" and Article IX17 (Kenpou Dai Kyu Jyo), dubbed the 'No War'
clause, was placed in the constitution in order to pacify the country's expansionist
tendencies.
There is some debate on the exact source of Article IX. According to

General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
(SCAP), then Prime Minister Kijur6 Shidehara suggested that he "wanted it to
prohibit any military establishment for Japan - any military establishment
whatsoever.''18 However some historians have attributed the inclusion of Article

IX to Deputy Chief of the government section of SCAP and one of General
MacArthur's closest associates, Charles L. Kades. The Supreme Commander for

the Allied Forces drafted the so-called MacArthur Note, which was used by
Charles L. Kades to draft a new Japanese constitution. The MacArthur Note
introduced the idea that the Japanese constitution would renounce war by saying,
"War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an

instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It
relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and

17 "Nihonkoku Kenpou" (Japanese Constitution), accessed 1 May 2013, http://law.e-

gov.go.jp/htmldata/S21/$21KE000.html.
18 David John Lu, Japan: A Docmnentary History: The Late Tokttgawa Period to the Present (New
York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997), 480.
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its protection.''19 Kades deleted the phrase 'even for preserving its own security'

when handing over the draft to the Japanese govermnent in 1946. In the final draft
accepted by the Diet, Article IX reads, "Aspiring sincerely to an international
peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a

sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling
international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragn'aph,
land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained.

The right of beligerency of the state will not be recognized.''2°
With the memory of Japan's past militarism receding further into history,
the relevance of Article IX has been coming under question. Shigeru Yoshida,
who served as Prime Minister of Japan fi'om 1946-1947 and again froln 19481954, emphasized Japan's economic recovery and a reliance on U.S. military,
known as the Yoshida Doctrine. He advocated maximum economic development

with minimum defense capability. His doctrine was built on the two pillars of the
war-renouncing constitution and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1951.

Although Yoshida rejected attempts by the U.S. to increase Japan's military
expenditure, he rejected them each time on the basis of Article IX.21 Yoshida's
policies were not rooted in pacifism but in the 1960s there was widespread
acceptance of the Constitution because of this of this doctrine. Public attitudes
began to shift since the late 1990s and Article IX has been the central feature of a
dispute over the ability of Japan to undertake multilateral military commitments
overseas. Soeya, Tadokoro and Welch point to the importance of understanding

19 Sayuri Umeda, Japan: Amendment of Constitution, Article IX(The Law Library of Congress,
February 2006), 7.
20 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat:Japan in the l'Vake of World War II (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, Inc., 1999), 396.
21 Takao Sebata, Japan's Defense Policy and Bto'eaucratic Polities, 1976-2007, (Maryland:
University Press of America, 2010), 199.
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that increased support for revising the constitution and the decline of support for
unarmed neutrality were not the result of a sudden 'rightward drift' in Japanese
politics but a support for Japanese contribution to international security through
peacekeeping operations. 22

In August 2004, then Secretary of State, Colin Powell issued a statement in
response to Japan's desire for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security

Council. Powell said that Japan must consider revising its pacifist constitution if it
wanted a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. He stated that the U.S.
supported Tolÿo's quest for a permanent seat at the Security Council, but added,
"If Japan is going to play a role on the world stage and become a full active
participating member of the Security Council, Article IX would have to be
examined in that light.''23 Then Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage also
commented that it would be difficult for Japan to become a permanent member of
the Security Council if it could not have a greater military role in international
peacekeeping and added that, "the war renouncing Article IX of Japan's
Constitution is becoming an obstacle to strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance.''24

Domestically, since the early 1990s, in order to solve the contradiction
between the existence of Japan's armed forces and the pacifist Article IX, the LDP
put constitutional revision on the top of their domestic policy agenda. Proposals of
the revision have centered around the revision of Article IX in order to make
Japan's armed forces constitutionally and formally legal. Under Junichir6
Koizumi, the LDP drafted a new constitution in 2005 seeking to give its military a

22 Soeya, Tadokoro and Welch, Japan as a Normal Comltry, 49.
23 Anthony Defilippo, Japan's Nuclear Disarmament Policy & the U.S. Security Umbrella (New
York: Palgq'ave MacMillian, 2006), 189.
24 "U.S. Questions Japan's Pacifism" BBC News, August 13, 2004, accessed Jan. 15, 2011,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3561378.stm.
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solid legal basis and leeway to fight abroadY They supported the right to
individual self-defense in the Constitution and the constitutionality of the selfdefense forces but were split, in particular, over the question of collective self-

defense. Moreover, ShinzO Abe, in his first term as Prime Minister in 2006
pursued constitutional revision as top priority on the LDP's policy agenda. There
was little support fi'om the electorate at the time and he was accused of setting
wrong priorities in times of economic transformation in Japan. The LDP
generally supports the reinterpretation or even the revision of Article IX so that
Japan could have more flexibility in international security operations.26 The DPJ
view on the Constitution differs froln LDP in the sense that the DPJ felt strongly
that Article IX was integral to Japan's national identity and a shield from U.S.
pressure to contribute to international efforts that may not be in Japan's core

national interests. However, DPJ leaders such as Seiji Maehara and Ichiro Ozawa
were also avid supporters of constitutional revision.

Article IX not only forbids the use of force as a means to settling
international disputes but also forbids Japan from maintaining an army, navy or
air force. Therefore, in strictly legal terms, Japan's Self Defense Force (JSDF) is
not at anny, navy and airforce, but extensions of the national police force. The
main reason Japan refers to its armed forces as 'Self Defense Forces' (Jieitai) is

because of Article IX. This has had broad implications for foreign, security and
defense policy. The LDP has interpreted A3"ticle IX as renouncing the use of
warfare in international disputes but not the internal use of force for the purpose of
maintaining law and order. The DPJ tends to concur with this interpretation and
25 "Jyuten Seisaku 2012" (2012 General Election PlatfornO, pg. 7 accessed May 1, 2013,
http://jimin.ncss.nifly.com/pdf/seisaku_ichiban24.pdf
26 Ayako Mie, "Abe Vows Again to Amend Article 9," Japan Times, Feb. 16, 2013, accessed Mar.
20, 2013, http://ÿvw.iapantimes.co.ip/news/2013/O2/16/national/abe-vows-again-to-amendarticle-9/.
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both parties have advocated the revision of Article IX by adding an extra clause
explicitly authorizing the use of force for the purpose of self-defense against
aggression directed against the Japanese nation. The now defunct Japan Socialist
Party had considered the JSDF as unconstitutional and advocated the full
implementation of Article IX through the demilitarization of Japan. When the
party joined with the LDP to form a coalition government, it reversed its position
and recognized the JSDF as a structure that was constitutional. The Japanese
Communist Party considers the JSDF unconstitutional and has called for
reorganization of Japanese defense policy to feature an armed militia.27 Only the
most extreme pacifist elements such as the Japanese Communist Party have

embraced these views and it has been largely ignored by Japanese courts, who
have reinforced the constitutionality of the armed self-defense.28
At the heart of Japan's debate over the country's security policy is the
notion of a 'normal' Japan. The term was popularized by Ochiro Ozawa in the

early 1990s, who called for Japan to play a more active role in global security
activities, especially those guided by the United Nations.29 But the term has meant
different things for different people.
Soeya, Tadokoro and Welch state that Japan is abnormal in two crucial
aspects: 1) It is unprecedented for a sovereign state not to have the right to wage
war or maintain armed forces: no other country has a constitutional provision

remotely similar to Article 9; 2) As a global economic powerhouse, it contributes

27"Japanese Communist Party, Program of the Japanese Communist Party," The Japanese
Communist Party Website, accessed May 21, 2013,
http:/Aÿvw.j cp.or.jp/english/23rd congress/program.html.
28 Herbert F. Bolz, "Judicial Review in Japan: The Strategy of Restraint," Hastings International

and Comparative Law Review 4 (1980): 87.
29 Ozawa, Bhteprint for a New Japan, 115.
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little to the provision of regional and global security.3° They then identify certain
internal and external factors as constraints that limit Japan's emergence as a
'normal' country. The constitution, antimilitaristic sentiment and governmental

and bureaucratic limitations are listed under internal constraints. Neighboring
countries' suspicions of renascent Japanese militarism, the domestic political

value in China and South Korea of not letting Japan off probation, potential
disruption of the regional balance of power and the U.S. security guarantee are
listed as external constraints. Soeya, Tadokoro and Welch argue that as a
consequence of these various constraints, Japan is unable to contribute to regional

and global security as it should.
Soeya, Tadokoro and Welch dismiss East Asia's (China and South Korea)
fear of Japan's rise to militarism due to the revision or elimination of Article IX
and the increased deployment of JSDF forces to global security missions as
merely based on historical memory that haunts these neighboring countries and
are otherwise groundless. This opinion is shared by Katsumata and Li who
maintain that most Chinese scholars and opinion leaders have simply been carried
away by their emotions.31

Katsumata and Li point to the ambiguousness of the term and explain that
the sceptics (China in their article) interpret the normalization of Japan as
synonymous with the military build up of the country. The calls for revising the
constitution and the push for increased deployment of JSDF troops on
peacekeeping missions are all seen by sceptics as a form of militarization.
Katsumata and Li argue that a correct interpretation of the term, the definition
introduced by Ozawa, should not alarm anyone. The Chinese interpretation of a

30 Soeya, Tadokoro and Welch, Japan as a Normal Counoy, 8.
31 Katsumata and Li, "China Wary of a 'Normal' Japan."
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normalized Japan is broken down into four categories: the radical interpretation,
where normalization is linked to the re-emergence of militarism; the moderate
interpretation where normalization is associated with the rise of Japanese
nationalism, i.e. enabling Japan to misrepresent and downplay their war-time

history; others who view the overseas deployment of the JSDF as a purpose aimed
at containing China and expanding Japan's sphere of influence in military terms;
and lastly, those who regard constitutional amendment as a purpose for Japan to
utilize military forces as a means to maximize its geopolitical interest. The one
common thread in all four categories of the Chinese interpretation is that
normalization equals militarization.
Katsumata and Li attempt to debunk this interpretation by illustrating tbat
the deployment of JSDF troops abroad and the push for constitutional change in
Japan has a different purpose altogether. They insist that the debate has always
been whether and how much Japan should participate in international
peacekeeping activities through the deployment of JSDF troops and constitutional
revision. Constitutional revision in this case is seen as a prerequisite for greater

international contributions by Japan. Public opinion polls from the Cabinet Office
of Japan in 1991 and 2003 are used to compare and illustrate the rise in the
percentage of the Japanese public's support for military contributions overseas:
46% in 1991 and 76% in 2003. A similar survey of 2006 is used to show that the
majority of the population were against an increase in the country's military
capabilities.
Hugo Dobson contributes to this dialogue by stating that Japan began to
build a role within the UN and peacekeeping operations in response to the Gulf

17

War of 1991 and identifies four norms that guided Japan's foreign and security
policy.
The norm of US bilateralism during the Gulf War created and shaped Japan's
identity through the use ofgaiatsu (foreign pressure). The humiliation
experienced after monetary contribution to the Gulf War that hammered Japan
with criticism was a significant step in Japan's effort to define an international
role beyond that of banker, in terms of 'East Asianism', Dobson states that East

Asian states have been carefully and sceptically observing the gradual shift of
Japan's policy to become positively engaged in international conflicts. He further
argues that the political response to Japan's peacekeeping policy has been staHdy
different between Southeast Asian and Far East Asian states. He points out that
China and Korea continue to be apprehensive of Japan's perceived remilitarization
through the participation in peacekeeping operations. Ultimately, Dobson argues
that the norm of UN internationalism and peacekeeping transcended all other
norms.

As illustrated by Dobson, here has been a lnarked increase in Japan's

JSDF deployment in recent years, hnmediately after the first Gulf War, Japan sent
its JSDF to Iraq to sweep for mines, followed by participation in a series of UN
peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Golan Heights, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
East Timor. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in the
U.S., Japan further increased it's participation in peacekeeping missions by
sending JSDF forces to the Indian Ocean to support the U.S.-led efforts in the
Afghan War and even Iraq. This alone proves the direction Japan is heading;
towards a normal Japan envisioned by Ozawa, a Japan involved in global security
through the dispatch of JSDF through peacekeeping missions.

18

The LDP and even some DPJ leaders, such as Hatoyama have spoken

about the revision of gaÿticle IX.32 But to date, it has not materialized. Unless the
legal requirement of how to change or amend the constitution will be changed,
revision of ga'ticle IX cannot realistically occur. The legal requirement as it stands
now is difficult to meet; in order to amend the constitution there needs to be a
two-thirds majority in both chambers, Upper and Lower House of Parliament.
On the Sixtieth anniversary of the Constitution, May 3, 2007, a massive
demonstration of 6,000 erupted in support of Article IX in Tokyo.33 Subsequently,
a survey taken on December 2010 showed a decrease in public support for
constitutional revision, Soeya, Tadokoro and Welch attribute this shift to the
public opposition following Iraq and Afghanistan.34 On April 27, 2012 the LDP
drafted a new version of the amendlnent.35 The proposed changes under 'National

Security' were made by adding Article 9-2, which stipulated that the National
Defense Force not only can defend the territory from a foreign attack and
participate in international peacekeeping operations but also can operate in order
to either maintain domestic public order or to protect individual rights. The draft
also put forward a revision to Article 96, stating that a simple majority in the two
Houses should be adequate for a motion for constitutional amendment.

As Japan marked Constitutional Memorial Day in 2013, the May 3
publication of the Mainichi newspaper published a poll conducted on 20 and 21
April from the Japanese public regarding their views on the revision of the
Constitution, namely Article 96, that provides that amendments can be made to

32 Axel Berkofsky, A Pacifist Constitution for an Armed Empire Past and Present of Japanese
SeeuriOÿ and Defense Policies (Milano: FrancoAngeli s.r. 1., 2012) 174.
33 ÿ th
ÿ,
60 Anniversary of the Japanese Constitution Celebrated,
Zenroren website (National
Confederation of Trade Unions), accessed May 21, 2013, http://wxÿv.zenroren.gr.ip.
34 Seoya, Tadokoro and Welch, Japan as a Normal CotmOy?, 53.
3s "Nihon-koku Kenpou Kaisei Souan, " http://www.jimin.jp/policy/policy-topics/pdf/seisaku109.pdf.
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any part of the constitution if met with a two-thirds approval from both the Upper
and Lower Houses of the Diet, instead of with just a simple majority.36 The poll
showed that 42% were in favour of revision, 46% not in favour and 11% did not
answer.

Linked closely to the issue of the revision of Article IX is the deployment
of JSDF troops abroad. Although there has not been any revision to the
Constitution yet, we have seen in recent years the increased deployment of JSDF
troops to non-combat areas in support of the United States and the United Nations
Peacekeeping Missions. In the 1960s, with the Yoshida Doctrine leading the way,
the constitution was strongly embraced by the Japanese people. A change in
attitude towards constitutional revision rose in the early 1990s with Ichiro
Ozawa's concept of a 'normal' Japan and the changing global security

environment guiding the debate. The Japanese leaders and the people, for the most
part seemed to understand the importance of Japan's contribution to international
security. Even without constitutional revision, Japanese leaders, with limits, were

able to broaden Japan's participation in the management of international security
as I will illustrate in the next chapter.

36 "Mainichi Shinbtm Seron Chosa: Kenpou 9@,o kaisei, hantai 46%", May 3, 2013, accessed

May 15, 2013, Mainichi Shinbun website,
http://mainichi.ip/select/news!20130503k000e01014000c.html,
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Chapter III.
The Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace

Keeping Operations and Other Operations (PKO Law) and The
Antiterrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML)
JSDF deployment oversees continues to be one of the most controversial
topics surrounding Japan's foreign policy. Since the end of the Second World
War, the topic of JSDF dispatch has been a particularly sensitive issue for Japan,
with Article IX as the central debate. As much as Japan aspires to contribute to
international peace and security, it also struggles to adhere to the constitution,
which clearly renounces the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy.

Japan is the second biggest financier ofUN peacekeeping operations after
the United States but in terms of personnel contributions, it is virtually nonexistent. Within the DPJ, there is general consensus that Japan's international
security contributions should fall more under UN auspices than a U.S. Japan
global alliance.37
The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was set up in the
Middle East in 1948, which identified the first-generation type ofpeacekeeping
missions to monitor ceasefires. A military peacekeeping force was dispatched to
be a buffer between the conflict states only after a ceasefire had been reached. The
central principles of these missions were the consent of the conflict parties, strict
impartiality, and the use of force only for self-defense. UN Peacekeeping Forces

in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan

37 "Olll" Basic Philosophy: Ore' Foreign Policy Stance, "DPJ website, accessed May 1, 2013,

http://www.dpj .or.j p/english/policy/
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Heights (UNDOF), are both examples of this first generation type peacekeeping
where they froze the conflicts but did not actively contribute to the resolution.
Characterized by a dynamic, multidimensional approach that aimed for
political, social and economic conflict resolution, the second generation type
peacekeeping arose during the late 1980s.38 Military peacekeepers, police and
civilian personnel were all deployed. The roles ofpeacekeepers also expanded as
they were tasked to not only monitor ceasefire agreements but to conduct

elections, provide humanitarian aid, engage in disarmament and repatriate
refugees. Rwanda and Bosnia in the mid-90s was an especially painful lesson for
peacekeeping, signing of a ceasefire agreement failed to bring an end to violence.
This led to the emphasis towards the ability of a peacekeeping force to protect not
only itself but also civilian personnel and local population, leading the way the
robust or third generation type peacekeeping.
Third generation peacekeeping missions were undertaken under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter39, endowed with a mandate by the UN Security Council to
use force against factions working to undermine the peace process. The Brahimi
Report4° emphasized the need to dispatch peacekeeping forces with sufficient
manpower and which were adequately equipped to provide a credible deterrent
threat. Although the principles of consent and impartiality remain cornerstones of
third generation peacekeeping, they are no longer accepted as a reason to ignore

massive human rights abuse or genocide. The Brahimi Report points out that "in
some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and

38 "Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace
Operations, "United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Publication, (New York:

United Nations, 2010)
39 "Chapter VII: Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of
Aggression," accessed January 15, 2011, xÿw.un.org/en/documents/charter.
4o Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, New York: United Nations
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victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force
but morally compelled to do so.''41 The major difference in these third generation
missions is that it explicitly includes the use of force in their mandate.
The Gulf War triggered a debate surrounding the international contribution
of Japan; whether Japan should begin contributing personnel to peacekeeping
missions. The crucial aspect was the possibility of dispatching JSDF personnel
abroad without giving up Japan's traditional pacifist position. The critidism fi'om
the U.S. and the international community was of Japan's checkbook diplomacy.

Criticism fi'om the world had an effect on the Japanese people and they were
disappointed that not only did they not receive any expression of gratitude from
these countries but were heavily criticized for its failure to provide direct military
assistance to the coalition. Japan's failure to be appreciated for its financial
contributions during the Gulf War was a wake-up call for Japanese leaders.

In 1991, the International Peace Cooperation Bill was presented to the Diet
and in 1992, the PKO Law, or the Law Concerning Cooperation for United
Nations Peace Keeping Operations and Other Operations, was passed, allowing
the JSDF troops to join peacekeeping operations, broadening Japan's security
policy. Many concessions were made by the LDP to ensure support of those
opposed, mostly focusing on the non-use of force. The biggest concession was

made to get support fi'om the Kolneito party but also from the DPJ. Almost every
risky task undel'taken in peacekeeping such as monitoring ceasefires, troop

demobilization, patrolling, transportation or storage of weapons was put on hold
until fiwther law was passed. The PKO Law included the Five Principles for
Japanese participation in PKOs, which determined that:

41 "Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations" A/55/305-S/2000/809, (New York: United
Nations, 2000) 9.
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1) A ceasefire must have been reached between the conflict parties prior
to deployment;
2) The conflict parties have to give their consent to a) the deployment of
the peacekeeping force and b) Japanese participation in that force;
3) The peacekeeping force has to be strictly impartial;
4) The Japanese government may withdraw its contingent if one of the
criteria should not be satisfied anymore; and
5) The use of weapons be limited to the self defense of Japanese

soldiersY
Since the passage of the PKO Law, Japanese personnel have participated
in a nulnber of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. In September of
that year, the first JSDF units headed to Cambodia to join a PKO. However, under
the limits of law set by the five principles, the JSDF was forbidden to take part in
the work of the main PKO body, that it posed numerous problems for the practice
ofpeacekeeping missions. Each time JSDF personnel were asked to fulfil duties
that were not originally agreed on, the commanders would request government

approval. The nervousness of both the governments and JSDF personnel to violate
the PKO Law slowed down the response, resulting in the JSDF rarely assuming
duties beyond what was originally detailed in the implementation plan. The
limitations caused fi'iction between the JSDF and other personnel on the ground.
Furthermore, specifically, the fifth principle concerning the use of force is
in contrast to the UN interpretation of self-defense. The PKO Law of 1992 only
permits JSDF nlembers to use force to defend themselves while the UN
interpretation of self-defense included the defense of the mission as a whole. "In

42 Katsumi I shizuka (2004): Japan and UN Peace Operations, Japanese Journal of Political
Science, 5(1), pp.140-141.
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the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMR), for instance, JSDF members
had to decline a request to help look for missing UN staff; in UNTAC, the
Japanese civilian police force was the only contingent not able to participate in the
arrest of individuals violating the election process.''43

The strict limits set by the PKO Law resulted in many conflicts with UN
PKOs, prompting the revision of the law in 1998. "The new law permitted the
JSDF to participate in election-monitoring activities organized not only by the UN
but also by regional organizations. Furthermore, the ceasefire requirement (first

principle) was dropped for humanitarian missions involving the Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Moreover, the law modified the
rules for the use of force. While JSDF members were still permitted to use force
only to defend themselves, this is no longer depended on the individual's
judgment but could be ordered by the commanding field officers.''44 The changes
were not extreme in any stretch but the willingness and desire of the Japanese
government to revise the law showed that they viewed PKO missions as an
important policy option and a re-emergence of the revisionists, who embrace the

collective security norms in the hope of expanding Japanese security policy. The
govermnent has gradually adapted the legal basis for military peace operations in
the interpretation of the constitution.
The PKO law was revised again in December of2011, post September 11,
2001. Unlike the last revision, this revision brought a number of significant
changes. It lifted the freeze on peacekeeping activities such as monitoring
ceasefires, patrolling demilitarized zones, transporting weapons etc. It changed the

43 Katsumi Ishizuka (2005): Japan's Policy towards UN Peacekeeping Operations, International
Peacekeeping, 12 (1), pp.77.
44 Katsumi Ishizuka (2004), Japan and UN Peace Operations, Japan's Journal of Political Science,

5 (1), pp.142.
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rules for the use of force. Like the ATSML, the revised PKO Law permitted
deployed JSDF personnel to use force to protect people under their control. For
instance, members of other countries' armed forces, refugees, UN and other
international organizations' personnel and government officials, as well as

weapons stores. The law made the legal fi'amework compatible with the Brahimi
report which also played a role in changing the Japanese position.45 Despite these
changes, the possibilities for the JSDF participation in UN peacekeeping missions
are still limited to traditional peacekeeping missions and still have to strictly abide
by guidelines set in the PKO Law. Having said that, extensions of the dispatch of
JSDF troops have been on-going: extension of JSDF troops to UNDOF (UN
Disengagement Observer Force) in the Golan Heights until mid-2012 and the
extension of JSDF troops to UNMISS (UN Mission in the South Sudan) was also
extended until October 3, 2013.46
The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York on September
t 1, 2001 shook Japan's optimism for peace and stability post Cold War. The
unconventional global threat often'orism shocked the world and increased Japan's
sense of vulnerability. Japan took concrete measures after the September 11, 2001
incident to show their support for the United States and contributed more actively
to international security. The shift in security strategy was driven largely by the
leadership of former Prime Minister Koizumi and his partnership with former
President George W. Bush after the September 11, 2001 attack. During this time,
then Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage sought Japan's cooperation in
U.S. campaigns against terrorism. This led to the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism
4s Hugo Dobson, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping: New Pressures, New Responses

(London: Routledge, 2003).
46 "Extension of the Dispatch of the International Peace Cooperation Corps in South Sudan,"
October 16, 2012, accessed May 1, 2013, Ministry of Foreign Aflhirs of Japan website,
xÿ,w.mofa.go.ip/announce/announce/2012/10/1016 01.html.
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Special Measures Law (ATSML), which allowed for the JSDF to operate on
foreign soil for the first time to provide non-combatant and humanitarian support.
It is important to note that in the beginning, there was a possibility that the DPJ
would support the ATSML, sending JSDF troops overseas in a bipartisan manner.
But eventually they voted against the bill because prior approval by the Diet for
overseas deployments was deemed unnecessary. But the ruling LDP party pushed

the bill through. JSDF ships were deployed on a refuelling mission to the Indian
Ocean starting November of 2001. The ATSML law was primarily intended to
fight terrorism but it helped pave the way for a revision of the Peace Keeping
Operations Law (PKO Law). Soon after, Japan sent naval support to the Arabian
Sea to assist coalition forces in the war in Afghanistan. In 2003 The Law
concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

in h'aq (Iraq Special Measures Law) was enacted, which enabled Japan to send
troops to an occupied territory where small-scale fighting continued but where
combat operations were not conducted or expected. In 2004, Japan began

deploying forces, numbering about 1,000 to Iraq, and withdrew in 2006.
The DPJ continued its criticism of the ATSML, portraying an
unwillingness to work with the United States in the war on terrorism for both
political and ideological reasons. When the bill was up for extension, the DPJ
voted against it each time in 2003, 2005 and 2006. Although the bill still passed
each time, the public support of the DPJ was growing as they persisted with their
criticism, targeting specifically that the U.S. may have used JSDF-supplied fuel
for operations in Iraq. The DPJ regarded the invasion of Iraq as illegitimate and
blasted Koizumi and his administration for the support of it. They felt very
strongly that Japan's participation by dispatching JSDF troops was against
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Japanese national interests.47 The DPJ called for the immediate withdrawal of
JDSF fi'om Iraq, clearly going against the concept of a U.S-Japan global alliance
launched by Bush and the Koizumi administration. In 2007, with the DPJ taking
control of the Upper House, the party was able to finally vote down the extension
of the Indian Ocean mission in 2007 and 2008 but only ended the mission on 1
January 2010.
Despite negative statements and criticism about the refuelling operation in
the Indian Ocean, they continued even after the DPJ rose to power. The

expectation was for them to withdraw almost immediately after the elections but
in reality it did not end until 1 January 2010. George W. Bush was gone and
President Barack Obama promised to withdraw troops from Iraq; how politics
regarding Iraq was playing out in the U.S. may have had an effect on the DPJ's
willingness to soften their stance slightly regarding the refuelling operation
compared to their adamant opposition when they were running. Ending the
mission was a campaign pledge of the DPJ and despite the desire of the United
States for Japan to continue the mission as a show of diplomatic support, albeit
not immediately, Hatoyama made good on his promise to end the mission,
although not adhering to the initial timeline assured to the Japanese people.

a7 "Kempo kaisei shian no chukan hokoku" (Interim Report of My Private Proposal on
Constitutional Revision), March 18, 2005, accessed May 1, 2013

http://www.ndl.go.jp/ip/data/publication/issue/O474.pdf, 9.
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Chapter IV.
The U.S. Factor and Base Realignment
The U.S. Japan Security Treaty was born in the midst of the Korean War
in 1951 when Japan couldn't ensure its security without arms. Bilateral talks on
revising the initial security pact began in 1959 and the new Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security was signed on January 19, 1960. The treaty promised
the United States to defend Japan and Japan to provide the U.S. armed forces with
bases for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the region as a
whole. The alliance has endured over fifty years and was vital during the days of
the Soviet Union, protecting it from Communist influence and providing the
United States with a vital strategic outpost. Moreover, U.S. ties to Japan were

crucial during the wars in Korea and Vietnam, in addition to other U.S.
interventions in Southeast Asia. The alliance can also be credited for Japan
becoming one of the largest economies in the world because of not having to
invest much of its GDP in defence. Japan was able to concentrate on post-war

economic recovery and rebuild with astonishing speed.
To many, the success of Japan's postwar constitution is evident by the fact

that Japanese troops have not set foot in a war zone since World War II. But with
the threat of communism gone, Japan's relationship with the U.S. began to change

as scepticism grew on both sides about the practicality of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Bilateral trade and economic disputes in the 1980s contributed to mistrust
and suspicion in both the U.S. and Japan. During this time, questions were raised

about the utility of the alliance, with added growing opposition in Japan regarding
the U.S. military presence in Japan. American scepticism about Japan's value as

an ally was reinforced by its lackluster response to the 1991 Gulf War, to which
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Japan comributed $13 billion but no troops. Japan's unwillingness in 1994 to
support the UN sanction against North Korea when they threatened to withdraw
from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty raised further doubt for the U.S. Moreover,
Japan expressed even greater reluctance to discuss potential military cooperation
with the U.S. in the event of a conflict with North Korea. In a potentially serious
crisis, this cautious Japanese response called into question the feasibility of the
U.S.-Japan alliance in the post Cold War era.

Due to the difficulties and disappointments in the early 1990s, the U.S.
urged Japan to take steps in transforming its security relationship with them. In
1995, Japan revised its National Defense Program Outline48 to include "situations
in areas surrounding Japan" and contributions to international peacekeeping as

integral parts of its defense strategy. The revised guidelines for the U.S.-Japan
Defense Cooperation of 199749 lacked specific details on how Japan might
support U.S. forces in the context of military operations. This deliberate omission
was due to Japan's reluctance to approach the sensitive issues of constraints under

Article IX of the Constitution and the apprehension for Japan to move into a more
active security role outside of its borders.

As Japan ended naval support for the Afghan War in January of 2010,
Hatoyama promised President Barack Obama that Japan would offer $5 billion in
civilian aid to assist in the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Another area that
the DPJ was able to work with the United States was on the issue of combatting
piracy. This view is in parallel to the LDP's position on the importance of

48 Lieutenant General (Ret.) H.C. Stackpole, "Japan's FY 2005 National Defense Program
Out#he: New Concepts, Old Compromises," March 2005, accessed January 15, 2011.
www.apcss.org/.../JapansFY2005NationalDefenseProgramOutline.pdf.
49 "Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Completion of the Review of the Guidelines
for U.S-Japan Defense Cooperation" Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, September 1997,
accessed January 15, 2011, http://ÿv.mofa.go.ip/region/n-america/U.S./security/defense.html.
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counter-piracy contribution. However, the DPJ objected to the LDP government's
counter-piracy measures bill, prefen'ing that the mission involve coast guard

instead of naval vessels.5° In July of 2011, Japan opened its first overseas military
base since WWII in Djibouti, located in the Horn of Afi'ica, in a continued effort
to combat piracy. Djibouti is strategically located between the Red Sea and the
Gulf of Aden across fi'om the conflict-ridden Yemen and borders the northwest
corner of equally troubled Somalia. The waters that separate it from Yemen is the
entryway for all maritime traffic passing between the Mediterranean Sea and the
Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian
Sea.

Naval deployments to the Gulf of Aden by several major nations are
designed to insure the fi'ee passage of commercial vessels and to supress the
capture of ships and their crews for ransom, an anti-piracy mission, authorized by

the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1838.sl According to Japanese
navy commander Keiz0 Kitagawa, Japan's interest in establishing a military base
in Afi'ica was "to fight piracy and for our self-defense. Japan is a maritime nation

and the increase in piracy in the Gulf of Aden through which 20,000 vessels said
every year is worrying.''s2

The 2005 DPJ election platform53 agreed with the LDP that Japan needs
the United States for both national defense and regional stability. The difference
arose with the position regarding global cooperation with the United States. The
50 Masayuki Naoshima, "Statement o17 Issuance of Order for Maritime Police Operations Relatilg
to Anti-Piracy Operations off the Coast of Soma#a, "DPJ website, March 13, 2009, accessed
Mayl, 2013, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/index.html?num=15466.

51 S/RES/1838 (2008), Resolution 1838 (2009), Adopted by the Security Council at its 5987th
meeting, Oct. 7, 2008.
52 Rick Rozoff, "When Empires Join Hands: Japanese ÿ4ilitar), Joins U.S. and NATO in Horn of
Africa," June 2010, accessed January 15, 2011,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid= 18869.
53 DPJ website, accessed May 1, 2013,
http://archive.dpj .or.j p/policy/manifesto/images/Manifesto_2005.pdf
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DPJ considered the United States as being unilateral and was reluctant to work
with them in dispatching the JSDF. With increasing participation of the JSDF
aboard, DPJ members were concerned about Japan being integrated in U.S. global

campaigns and sharing the burdens of military operations. With the DPJ's rise to
power in 2009, there was expectation that Japan would slowly turn away fi'om the
alliance of half a century. Yukio Hatoyama questioned the need for U.S. troops in
Japan and the growing preference for linking Japan more closely to U.N. Security
Council operations around the globe. However, with increasing regional unrest in

2010, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan strengthened again: North Korea's
constant provocation and advancing nuclear programs to a rift with China over a
ship collision in disputed waters a well as their growing military capabilities.
The problem with the DPJ's vision for a more independent diplomacy
(jiritsu teki na gaikou) for Japan is that they have not found a realistic alternative
to the alliance that provides Japan a stronger security presence in the world. Japan
has no other close partners in Asia and certainly none that will commit to its
defense. With China's growing political influence, Japan is finding their position
waning in comparison. This sense of ineffectiveness and lack of options have
fuelled resentment by some, of the dependence on the U.S.

In general, the DPJ opposed to what they recognized as the Liberal
Democratic Party's lockstep support for U.S. policy throughout the post-war

period. The DPJ wanted to see Japan play a role more independent of the U.S.,
leveraging its economic wealth and technological prowess to influence regional
and global issues and to think and act globally within a multilateral fralnework,
such as under the auspices of the United Nations. Japanese security policy in
postwar years engaged in international security only through its alliance with the
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United States. Throughout the years both LDP and DPJ leaders have broadened
Japan's contribution. DPJ vision in regards to increased participation in
peacekeeping missions is being brought to fruition but ties with the U.S. are also
being strengthened by factors that will be discussed in the coming chapters. The
combination of increased peacekeeping contributions by Japan and the
strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance is exactly the vision Ozawa advocated.

The Okinawa base realigmnent issue has been one of the most important
factors in the U.S.-Japan alliance but it has also become a nettling issue over the

years. A large portion of the residents of Okinawa have long voiced grievances
over the arrangement of the Futenma airbase. In exchange for providing bases,

Japan on the whole has benefited from U.S. security while the prefecture of
Okinawa has borne the burden of hosting thousands of foreign troops. Okinawa's
economy is highly dependent on the bases but violence by U.S. troops, petty crime
and environmental degradation stemming froln the U.S. presence are just some of

the grievances by local Okinawans. The 1995 gang rape of a Japanese schoolgirl
by Alnerican servicemen U.S. military helicopter crashing into a crowded
university campus in 2004, and most recently, a rape of a Japanese woman by two

U.S. sailors in October of 2012, continue to escalate public outcry against the
bases.

The DPJ was very clear with their promise to examine the U.S. force
structure in Japan, especially in Okinawa where 75% of the U.S. military forces
are based in Japan.54They promised to review the Special Action Committee on

54 Arata Yamamoto and John Newland, "In Okinawa, the War isn't Over: Protests Aimed at U.S.
Base Expansion," NBC News, April 13, 2013, accessed May 24, 20t3,
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/ news/2013/04/13/17 598118-in-okinawa-the-war-isnt-overprotests-aimed-at-us-base-expansion?lite.
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Okinawa Report55, the reduction of U.S. bases and the transfer of the Okinawa
base abroad. In addition, they voted against the Guam transfer in 2007, arguing
that the costs borne by Japan for the transfer were not articulated sufficiently by
the government. The relations between Japan and the United States became even

more hopelessly tangled under the administration of former Prime Minister Yukio
Hatoyama, who attempted to move the U.S. Marine base (Futemna) out of
Okinawa, contrary to a previous agreement with Washington to replace the
Futemna base in a less-populated coastal area of Okinawa. The two sides finally
agreed to stick with the original plan and relocate Marine Corps Air Station
Futenma to a less-populated part of the island and to Guam but this controversial
issue eventually forced Prime Minister Hatoyama to resign in June 2010.56
In February of 2012, then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda visited
Okinawa after six months in office. In his meeting with Okinawa Governor
Hirokazu Nakaima, Noda apologized for the DPJ's indecisive actions on the
Futenma relocation issue. However, Noda reiterated the government's official

position of relocating the Futenma facility to Nago. In return, Nakaima repeated
his unwavering stance that the air base be transferred outside of Okinawa
prefecture.57 Governor Nakaima's argument has always been that it would be

impossible to preserve the lives of residents and the enviromnent by relocating the
base to Nago. Hatoyama and the DPJ were not prepared to put the main burden of
U.S. military presence in Japan on Okinawa as did their LDP predecessors,

55 "The SACO Final Report," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 2, 1996, accessed,
January 15, 2011, http://w\ÿv.mofa.go.jph'egion/n-america/us/securit5496saco1.html.
56 Blaine Harden, "Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama Resigns," Washington Post, June 2,
2010, accessed Aug. 29, 2010, http://xÿvw.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2010/06/02/AR2010060200199.html.
57 "Kankyo hozen ha hukano to meiki. Henoko asesu, chijiken wo teishutsu" It will be impossible
to preserve the environment. Okinawa Governor rejects the central government environmental
impact report for the relocation to Henoko) Ryukyu Shimpo, Feb 20, 2012, accessed May 1, 2013,
http://ryukyushimpo.ip/news/storyid- 187671-storytopic-3.html.
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regardless of protests and problems associated with the U.S. military presence in
Okinawa.

As one of the last acts of his government in May of 2010,
Hatoyama endorsed the plan to build the base in Nago.58 Tobias Harris, in his
2009 East Asia Forum alÿicle states that the DPJ's victory in part was a product of
public dissatisfaction of the LDP not consulting the people and regarding them
ahnost as an afterthought, especially in the alliance issue.59 With all the promises
made by the DPJ regarding the relocation of Futenma out of Okinawa, the result
was more of the same; the government, once again, ignored the voices of the

people. This issue and the mishandling of it by Hatoyama cost him to resign.
On November 14, 2009, President Obama spoke of the revitalization of the
U.S.-Japan alliance in Tokyo.6° In the fall of 2010, President Obama and
Hatoyama's successor, Naoto Kan, held a bilateral meeting to reaffirm the
importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance and agreed to continue Host Nation Support

(HNS), the funds provided to contribute to the cost of stationing U.S. troops in
Japan until 2016. Hatoyama's inability to envision an alternative plan, or even
how to approach an alternative failed to implement the move. From a landslide
election victory to resignation in nine months, this was an example of Hatoyama

and the DPJ discovering that despite campaign promises, this issue was
impossible to fiflfil.

58 "Hatoyama Taps Nago for Base Relocation," Japan Times, May 12, 2010, accessed May 1,
2013, http://www.japantimes.cÿ.jp/news/2ÿ ÿ ÿ/ÿ5/ ÿ2/natiÿnaÿ/hatÿyama-taps-nagÿ-fÿr-baserelocation.
59 Tobias Harris, "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Time for the U.S. to Accept New Realities," November 15,
2009, accessed March 15, 2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.orÿ/2009/11/15/us@pan-alliance-timefor-the-us-to-accept-new-realities/.

6°"Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall," November 14, 2009, accessed May 1,
2013, Office of the Press Secretary, http://xÿv.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-barack-obama-suntorv-hall.
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In the 2009 DPJ Manifesto, unlike it's previous ones, the emphasis was
more on economics and social welfare than on foreign relations and security.61

There is a clear toning down of controversial proposals that raised Aanerican
anxieties. Perhaps the DPJ realized the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance,

especially within the increasingly dangerous neighbourhood Japan lives in today,
amidst a re-rising China and North Korea with its nuclear capabilities and hostile
intentions. The next chapter discusses these regional threats and the importance of
the U.S.-Japan alliance as an important factor in Asian peace, security and

stability.

61 DPJ website, accessed May 1, 2013,

http://www.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/seisaku2009/index.html
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Chapter V.

DANGEROUS NEIGHBORS
Regional threats have been escalating over the years with China's
expanding economic, military and political power and its aggressive intrusions
into Japan's territory, the increasingly hostile North Korea as well as territorial
disputes with South Korea. Seiji Maehara's keynote speech at the AEI Conference
on October 25, 2005 was only one of the speeches that emphasized the U.S.-Japan
alliance. Maehara reiterated that, "Its signifcance has not decreased since the end

of the Cold War" and that Japan will "contribute to the peace and stability of Asia
and the international community while holding firmly to the anchor of the JapanU.S. Alliance. The Alliance would have an even more important role to play from
now on in resolving the challenges of the 21 st century.''62

Japan's relationship with China is two-dimensional; economically they are
interdependent while they often suffer from political rifts. In her 2012 East Asia
Forum article, Amy King declares that China is Japan's largest trade partner and
Japan is China's second largest trade partner after the U.S.63 Reaching out to

China was not new for Japan but the DPJ's emphasis on engaging China and Asia
as a whole was in contrast with the LDP's (especially Koizumi) emphasis on U.S.Japan relations. DPJ party platforms address Japan's wartime aggression and

insist that Japan, as a 'member of Asia' build relations of"basic trust with
neigboring countries and deepen diplomatic and economic ties with each Asian
country...Regarding China, a country of prime importance to the peace and

62 "Agenda for Strengthening Japan-U.S. Alliance - Achieving World Peace and Happiness
Through Prosperity," Keynote Speech by Seiji Maehara, President DPJ, AEI Conference, October
25, 2005, accessed May 1, 2013, DPJ website, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english!news/051029/04.html.
63 Amy King, "Japan and China: Warm Trade Ties Temper Political Tensions," East Asia Forum,
October 22, 2012, accessed May 21, 2013, xÿv.eastasiaforum.org/2012/10/22/japan-and-chinawarm-trade-ties-temper-political-tensions/.
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stability of the Asia-Pacific region, we will Wol'k to develop friendly, cooperative
relationship fi'om a long-term perspective.''64 A stark difference to then-Foreign

Minister Taro Aso's December 2005 remark about China, "A neighboring country
has an atomic bomb and its military spending has been rising at a double digit rate
for 17 consecutive years. There is little transparency and I view that as a concern,
a threat.''65 Showing that the view was universal in Japanese officialdom, the

Foreign Minister backed the "China threat" theory promoted in the United States
by Seiji Maehara at the U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies66,
former Foreign Minister under Naoto Kan's administration. As Soeya, Tadokori
and Welch point out, these views are shared by a few right-wing conservatives as

a result of manipulation of opinion and is not one that is shared by the majority of
the Japanese leaders or people.67

As Japan campaigns to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations
Security Council it faces countless ardent opposition from its regional neighbors
and international community. South Korea and China especially point to a
disturbing lack of remorse shown by Japan and to the active, international and
systematic denial of war-time responsibility by high-ranking officials.68 Japan's
neighbors who fell victim to the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second
World War remain uneasy about a Japan with the power of veto on the UN
Security Council.

64"0111' Basic Philosophy: Ottr Foreign Policy Stance," accessed May 1, 2013, DPJ website,
http:/Aÿ,ÿ,ÿv, dpj. ot'.jp/english/poliey/.
65 Press Conference by Foreign Minister, Taro Aso, December 2005, accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.mofa.go.j p/announce/fin press/2005/12/1222.html.
66 Japan Chair Forum: DPJ's Vision on Domestic and Foreign Policy, December 8, 2005, accessed
May 1, 2013, Center for Strategic and International Studies website, https://csis.org/event/japanchair-forum-dpj s-vision-domestic-and-foreign-policy.

67 Soeya, Tadokoro and Welch Japan as a Normal Cotmtly?, 123.
68 Patrick Goodenough, "History, Rivalry Cloud Japan's Hopes for UN Security Council Seat,"
CSN News, July 7, 2008, accessed Feb. 25, 2011, www.csnnews,com/news/article/history-rivalrycloud-iapans-hopes-un-security-council-seat.
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Visits of Japanese politicians to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine have
been a major problem for South Korea and China, due to enshrinement of Class A
war criminals. Despite Koizumi's insistence that his visits were personal and that

he prayed for peace, the shrine registry was often signed in his official title as
Prime Minister.69 Due to the enshrinement of International Military Tribunal for
the Far East (1MTFE) war criminals, the Yasukuni Shrine and the Japanese
Government have been heavily criticized by China and Korea for being revisionist
and unapologetic. A welcome shift in this controversy came shortly after then-

Prime Minister Naoto Kan took office. In June 2010 he announced the following,
"As Class A war criminals are enshrined there, an official visit by the Prime
Minister or Cabinet Members is problematic. I have no plans to make a visit
during my tenure.''7° In addition to his stance regarding visits to Yasukuni Shrine,
Prime Minister Kan apologized to Korea on the 100th anniversary of Japan's
colonization of the peninsula.71

Another incident that led to a rift in Sino-Japanese relations as well as
heavy criticism towards Naoto Kan, was when a Chinese fishing boat collided
with two Japanese coastguard patrol boats near the oil rich uninhabited island of
Senkaku (Daioyu) on September 7, 2010. The Coastguards swiftly arrested the
crew and captain of the Chinese fishing boat, which led to anti-Japanese protests
in Chinese cities. What followed were a series of events that marked a low point
in foreign relations for Japan. Then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao refused to meet
with Naoto Kan and on November 1, 2010, the Russian President visited the

69 Anthony Faiola, "Koizumi Stirs Anger With War Shrine Visit," Washington Post, August 15,
2006, accessed April 15, 2011,

http://www.washinÿtonpost.com/wpdvn/content/article/2OO6/O8/14/AR2006081401425.html.
70 Gavin Blair, "Japan PM Kan Sends Signal to Asian Neighbors by Shmming Yasttkuni Shrine,"
Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 10, 2010.
vl Martin Feckler, "Japan Apologizes to South Korea o11 Colonization, "August 2010, accessed
My 1, 2013, NY Times, http://\ÿvw.ngtimes.com/2010/08/1 I/world/asia/1 liapan.html.
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dispmed southern Kuril islands, which the Soviet Union annexed fi'om Japan in
1945.
August 12, 2012 marked the 67th anniversary of Japan's surrender in
WWII and on the same day Chinese activists raising flags arrived at the Senkaku
Islands. Instead of prosecuting the fourteen Chinese activists on board, the ship,
they were deported in a move to tone down the fi'iction between Japan and China.
Then-Prime Minister Noda was heavily criticized for being weak, unable to standup to a rising China. On the same day, two Japanese cabinet ministers visited
Yasukuni Shrine.

Territorial disputes were not a unique problem only between China and
Japan. On August 10, 2012, the Diet enacted legislation to carry out the tax hike
as led by Noda. On the same day, then-President of South Korea, Lee Myung-bak
made a trip to Takeshima (Dokdo), a group of small islets in the Sea of Japan.
Sovereignty over these islets is disputed between Japan and South Korea. A few
days later President Lee urged Emperor Akihito to apologize for Japan's colonial
rule of the Korean Peninsula if he wished to visit South Korea. Although the
Emperor had no plans on visiting South Korea, the Imperial Household Agency
(kunaicho) and Japanese government officials were puzzled by President Lee's
statement and demanded Korea to apologize for the insult to the Emperor and to
withdraw the remark.Y2All of these events were a test to the DPJ to showcase their
ability to actually carry out their platforna of working closely with Asian
countries.

72 "Daitotyo hatsttgen ni tomadou ktmaicho-lÿankoku heno omoi awarshitekita heika, " (Imperial
Household Agency puzzled by Lee's statement -Emperor has shown concerns about Korean
people over the years) August 16, 2012, accessed May 1, 2013, Asahi Shimbun,

http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0816/TKY201208160086.html.
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Relations with North Korea has also been shalÿ, to say the least. The
communist state fired a Taepodong-1 missile, purportedly carrying a satellite, over
Japan in August 1998, demonstrating that virtually any target in Japan was within
its range. The suspicion in regard to nuclear weapons owned by North Korea and
its missile test over Japan in 1993 drove the Japanese to seek concrete security
measures against them by reviewing the Japan-U.S. security measures against

North Korea by revising the Japan-U.S. security agreement and the guidelines of
1978. The new guidelines, approved by the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative
Committee in 1997 stated, "Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations
of its constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance
of its exclusively defense oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.''73

This act by the Korean regime had tremendous impact on Japan's national
security. North Korea is not a signatory of the Missile Technology Control
Regime74 and states that it has the sovereign right to test its missile and pursue its
weapons program.

In March of 1999 the first of two suspicious boat incidents involving the
two countries occurred. In the first incident that year, the first-ever Japanese

maritime security operation since World War II was ordered against the two
suspicious North Korean boats. In the second incident in December 2001, an
unidentified ship was spotted in Japan's nautical exclusive economic zone and
Japanese forces surrounded the disguised fishing boat with an Aegis battleship, 25

73 "MOFA: The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation," accessed January 30, 2012,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, www.mofa.go.jph'egion/namerica/us/security/guideline2.html.
74 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation, March 4, 2009, http://www.state.gov/t/ish!rls/fs/12OO17.htm
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patrol boats and four jets.75 When the vessel began to flee, Japanese ships fired
warning shots and gave pursuit. Two crew members of the suspicious boat fired
shoulder-launched rockets at Japan's coast guard vessels. The rocket missed but

three Japanese sailors were injured in an exchange of fire. Eventually the ship was
sunk inside China's exclusive economic zone. Then Prime Minister Koizumi
accused North Korea of sending the ship, while Pyongyang denied all
involvement. But the images of this incident was widely publicized in Japan,
undeniably triggering anxiety within the public of the potential 'real' danger of
North Korea.

In 2002, Kim-Jong-il admitted that North Korea abducted several Japanese
citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. This led to a popular support for a hard-line
stance on North Korea. In 2003, under Koizumi, Japan launched its first spy
satellite in order to track North Korean threats without relying on intelligence
from others.

On October 9, 2006 after several days of warning, North Korea detonated
a nuclear device underground, 240 miles north-east of the capital, Pyongyang.

North Korea claimed it had performed the test to deter military aggression froln
the United States. The uncertainty over the future direction of issues related to
North Korea is undoubtedly one factor that forced Japanese politicians to
reconsider its security policy. Japanese leaders have been very concerned about
the various ongoing difficulties and imnfinent threats posed by North Korea even
before the 2006 nuclear test. Korea's stance on the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration76
with Japan was that the agreement was void due to Japan's failure to normalize
75 Mark E. Manyin, Japan-North Korea Relations: Seleeted lssttes,

http://www.nautilus.org/publications/boks/dprkbb/iapan/CRS.pdf (Nov. 2003), Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress.
76 "Japan-DPRK Prongyang Declaration," Sept, 2002, accessed May 1, 2013, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs website, http://www.mofa.ÿo.ip/reÿion/asoa-laci/n korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html.
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relations with the regime. U.S. sanctions following the six-party talks are also

cited by North Korea as a reason to continue missile tests and other aspects of its
weapons program. Overnight, the need to strengthen Japan's missile defences
became imperative.

Japan was a participant to the Six-Party talks, the diplomatic route used to
resolve the concern brought about by North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

These talks were a series of meetings with six participating states: China, South
Korea, North Korea, the United States and Russia being the others, and were as a
result of North Korea withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in
2003. The aim of the talks was to find a peaceful resolution to the security
concerns raised by the North Korean nuclear weapons program but they were and

still continue to be unsuccessful in dissuading the North Koreans from pursuing
nuclear weapons. North Korea has had underground nuclear test in 2006, 2009
and 2010 and rocket launches in 2009 and 2010. The UN Security Council has
passed four resolutions since 2006 aimed at penalizing North Korea for its nuclear
weapons program. North Korea has threatened to attack the United States, South
Korea and Japan since the new U.N. sanction was imposed in response to their
nuclear arms test in February of 2013.

How far all of these events impacted Japanese security thinking is
underscored by various remarks and actions that followed after certain incidents.

In January 2003, Defense Agency Director-General Shigeru Ishiba exclaimed that
Japan would be justified in striking a North Korean missile base if North Korea
loaded fuel into missiles targeted at Japan.77 This in itself was a remarkable

v7 Ishiba Boueicho Chokan, "Jieitai ni takoku koltgeld noltryoku kentou ni atai sltru," (We should
take into consideration that JSDF could use armed force to stop armed attack on a foreign country)
March 27, 2003, accessed May 1, 2013, Japan Press Network website,

http://www.47news.j p/CN/200303/CN2003032701000196.html.
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statement. Weeks after the October 9, where North Korea detonated a nuclear

device underground, then-Prime Minister Shinz6 Abe disclosed in an interview
that he wanted to rewrite the country's post-World War II pacifist constitution
including the clause that forever renounces war. Abe was a long-time advocate for

revising the constitution but it was the first time since he became Prime Minister
in September 2006 that he has expressed his intention to rewrite the warrenouncing Article IX. "I believe that this article needs to be revised from the
viewpoint of defending Japan. Japanese people should themselves write a
constitution that befits the 21st century,''78 Abe remarked. Abe pointed out that the
current constitution was written before Japan became independent after the war

and that the country was now expected to play a greater role in international
security. In this instance, even the DPJ members were in support of a revision,

although opinions on how far to deviate from Japan's official pacifism were
mixed.

On November 23, 2010, the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong endured
an onslaught of North Korean artillery. The Yellow Sea border has been one of
the worst border conflicts between the North and South in half a century. As the
international comlnunity rallied to condemn these attacks, Pyongyang claimed that
South Korea attacked first. Despite the on-going border conflict between the two
Koreas, U.S. National Security Adviser, Tom Donilon, as well as others believe

that Pyongyang's decision to fire now was part of their tireless "provocation and

78 "Abe Shusho, seisai kaigi 11o zenkaicchi saitaku wo kangeL "(PM Abe pleased with unanimous
decision of UN Sanction against North Korea) October 15, 2006, accessed May 1, 2013, Yomiuri
Shumbun, http://w\sÿv, yomiuri.co.ip/feature/fe7OOO/news/2OO61015itO2.htm.
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extreme rhetoric to get the assistance it desperately needs and the respect it claims
it wants....79

In early December 2010, Japan and the U.S. began their biggest ever joint
military exercise as South Korea warned it would carry out air strikes against the
Nolÿh if the regime repeated its attack on Yeonpyeong. The drills took place in
southern Japanese waters and were held to mark the 50th anniversary of the

countries' security alliance. This undoubtedly showed solidarity between Japan
and the United States and the continued U.S. commitment to its ally and its ability
to project military force in the region.
China's involvement in this regional crisis is also key. China, North
Korea's long-standing sole ally in the region since the People's Liberation Army
soldiers fought during the Korean War on the North's behalf, hesitated to criticize
the attack on Yeonpyeong. The two countries not only share a historical
ideological bond but a collapse of the Nol"ÿh Korean regime would mean an influx
of refugees flooding into China; something China would like to avoid.8°
In early 2010, a $6 billion plus weapons sale was conducted from the U.S.
to Taiwan, an island that Beijing considers a breakaway province. For Beijing, if
U.S. sells weapons to Taiwan, they will not act for U.S. interest on the North
Korean issue. China was expected by the U.S. to do whatever it could to

spearhead dialogues and negotiations with Pyongyang on the nuclear issue. In
response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry called for a resumption of the Six-Party
talks. This dialogue, however, broke down in 2008 when North Korea announced
that it would continue to work on their nuclear enrichment.
79 Tom Watkins and Ed Payne, "Pyongyang Scraps Armistice Amid Heightened Saber Rattling,"
March 11, 2013, accessed May 1, 2013, xÿvw.cnn.com/203/03/11/world/asia/south-korea-militaryexercises.

8o Celia Hatton, April 12, 2013, accessed May 3, 2013, BBC News, www.bbc.co.uk/newsAvorldasia-china-22062589.
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In February of 2012, North Korea, now headed by Kim Jong-un, agreed to
stop nuclear tests, uranium enrichment and long-range missile launches, and to

allow checks by nuclear inspectors, which was halted back in 2009. This was a
major policy shift for North Korea but many, including Japan, were sceptical. The
most recent threat froln North Korea came in early May 2013 when short range
missiles were fired. Whatever North Korea is trying to accomplish with its threats,
whether it be seeking aid and other concessions; simply wanting to be recognized
as a nuclear state or genuinely fearful of an attack by the U.S. or South Korea

therefore using its show of might as deterrence, they have managed to present
clear threats to Japan and this in turn has strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The DPJ attached a high-level of importance to coordinating with the
United States on international efforts at nuclear non-proliferation. Their anti-

nuclear vision was not limited to only Japan but for a nuclear-free zone within the
region. President Obama's April 5, 2009 speech on a nuclear-free world had a
positive impact on the DPJ's willingness to work with the United States on this
issue.81 Hatoyama endorsed President Obama's vision by stating that, "realizing a
nuclear-free world as called for by U.S. President Barack Obama is exactly the
moral mission of our country.''82 With increased provocation from North Korea in
recent years, there was concern of what Japan would do, especially under the LDP

and its strong rhetoric against the country. The DPJ had a more sharply antinuclear stand than did their predecessors and on this issue, they managed to
strengthen alliances with the U.S.

81 Text of President Obama's April 5, 2009, speech in Prague,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thejoress office/Remarks-B¥-President-Barack-Obama-In-PragueAs-Delivered.
82 Issei Kato, "Japan Opposition Backs Obama's Nuclear-Free Plan," August 6, 2009, accessed
May 1, 2013, www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/O6/us-iapan-nucleaMdUSTRES750LU20090806.
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Conclusion
The DPJ, after only three years and three months in office lost its position
as the ruling party in the general election of December 16, 2012. In the three
years, they went through three Prime Ministers, each of whom disappointed voters
in his own way. In a post election poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun, an
astounding 81% of the respondents cited that they were disappointed with the DPJ
govemlnent when asked what they thought was the reason for the LDP victory.83
Just as they won big in 2009, their downfall was comparable.
Prior to the 2009 general election, Japan was governed by one ruling party
fi'om 1955-2009, with only one brief interlude out of power in 1993-1994. The
DPJ victory in 2009 was due to a disillusioned public, tired of the LDP's
bureaucracy and scandals, as well as a domestic economy that seemed to be

getting worse. The DPJ appealed successfully to the voters by promising to bring
regime change (Seikenk6tai). Not only did they promise to tame the bureaucracy
but promised a closer alliance with its Asian neghbors and a depal"mre fi'om the
intimate alliance with the United States. But by the time the DPJ 2009 manifesto
was released, there was a change in their positions regarding key issues that won
them their initial victory and separated them fi'oln the policies of the LDP.
Whether they were real ideological changes or not is hard to say because the DPJ
party was always made up of a conglomerate of right and left wing politicians.
Initially, the leadership positioned the party as 'liberal' or left leaning to stand out
fi'om the right leaning LDP.
The DPJ rose to power during a time of national and global turmoil; the
economy of Japan was a shambles as well as the world's, and Japan faced

83 Asahi Simbun, "Asahi Poll: Voters Mixed on Abe, LDP Victory," December 19, 2012, accessed

Jan. 25, 2013, http://aiw.asahi.com/article/behind news/politics/A J201212190060.
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challenges fi'oln a newly assertive China and an erratic North Korea. The March

11,2011 earthquake/tsunalni/nuclear meltdown further overwhelmed the DPJ
leadership. But the DPJ loss in 2012 cannot only be attributed to them being dealt
a bad hand. The way in which the DPJ leaders handled key crises cause public
disillusionment and a view that the DPJ promised so much and delivered little.
Challenges to the DPJ's idealistic promises regarding foreign and security
policy started soon after they took office; the row with China over the Senkaku
islands, the visit to the Kuril Islands by former Russian Premier, the strain with
the United States over the Marine Base in Okinawa and widespread fear of
menacing airstrikes fi'om North Korea. The incidents with China, South Korea and
Russia regarding the disputed islands were an early lesson to the DPJ on the value
of the U.S. alliance. The DPJ almost immediately toned down their talk of a
greater policy independence from the U.S. and instead began to emphasize the
importance of continuing the alliance.
The Sino-Japanese relation has always been complicated by historical
legacies, political mistrust and security misgivings, that have always led to a
complex relationship. China has displaced the United States as Japan's largest
trading partner for some time now, making the two countries increasingly
interdependent. In political and security terms though, both China and Japan are
overwhelmed with antagonism and suspicion. The continuing sovereignty related
disagreement regarding the Senkaku Islands and China's aggressive behaviour
over the dispute shook the DPJ leaders. Kan et al looked as though they were not
able to sustain pressure from a major growing power and more importantly, these

incidents brought the U.S. and Japan closer, furthering the dichotomy between
what was promised by the DPJ in their election platform of 2009 and reality.
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Moreover, Noda took an uncompromising stand on the island dispute, despite
promises made by the DPJ for a stronger alliance with their Asian neighbors.
In the August 2009 election, Hatoyama pledged to shift the Futenma
airbase out of Okinawa prefecture by May 2000. Once in office, he quickly
realized that the U.S.-Japan alliance was a central importance for them and the

U.S. enforced their view that Okinawa was the focal point of the security pact,
especially that it was in close tactical proximity to North Korea, China and
Taiwan. BUt it was too late. He had put Japan through a year of agonizing tension
with its most important ally, only to have the Japanese government accept the
same base realigmnent plan that had existed at the start of his term. With the
growing threat from China and North Korea and in the event that the U.S. needed
to protect Taiwan fi'om China, Hatoyama was stuck. Moreover, in reality what

other options did Japan have in terms of a substitution of U.S. military protection?
With the economy a disaster, Japan couldn't afford to build it's own effective
defense structure if the alliance with the U.S. collapsed and even if they were
economically able, they were restrained by the Peace Constitution to be a credible
and effective force. Hatoyama unfortunately realized all of this after promises
were made to the Japanese people; resignation was the only way out.

The DPJ stance on constitutional reform remained ambiguous until the
end. On the other hand, LDP have always called for a re-appraisal of the
constitution. DPJ leaders were split on this issue until the end.
Naoto Kan faced the incredible challenge of the Tohoku earthquake and
Fukushima nuclear disaster. Delays in the release of information regarding
radiation leaks hurt him and his administration. He was further hurt by delays in
the passage of earthquake-recovery legislation. Yoshihiko Noda may have been
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the most effective leader but an unpopular one with voters who voted for certain
policies the DPJ advocated in the beginning. Noda was able to secure the support
of the LDP leaders for his plan to double the consumption tax. He was also able to
restart two nuclear reactors. However, the DPJ election platform vowed that it

would not raise the consumption tax and yet Noda took the lead. Similarly to other
issues, the DPJ flip-flopped on their anti-nuclear position; Kan as Prilne Minister
adopted a staunchly anti-nuclear position and yet Noda was the one to re-start the
two nuclear reactors after the meltdown of March 2011.

Ever since the DPJ assumed power it took steps to strengthen the political
relationship with South Korea. However, because of deep-seated historical

animosities and Japan's image of the evil colonial power among the Korean
people, both countries have failed to forge a strong political relationship. Naoto
Kan's apology in 2010 for the brutal occupation didn't achieve the effect that the
DPJ leaders expected. South Korea has always condemned Japanese leaders for

being too insensitive and apologetic but once given the apology, the reaction was
cool, a sign that South Korea, possibly, to a certain extent, wants this friction for
their own political gain. To this claim, Soeya, Tadokoro and Welch explained that
both China and South Korea have found it useful to remind their people as well as
the world that they have suffered at the hands of Japanese militarism, distracting
their people from issues that might generate dissatisfaction with their respective
regimes and of strengthening their cases in territorial disputes, in particular over
the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima.
North Korea has admitted to not only abducting Japanese citizens to help
train North Korean spies but continues to threaten Japan, it's regional neighbors
and the U.S. security by means of missile attacks. The North Korean regime
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remains unpredictable, aggressive and provocative. Under these menacing

conditions, the DPJ worked closely with the United States to deter North Korea,
once again averting from their promise of becoming more independent of the
United States.
The DPJ-led government faced the same external and internal situations
that the LDP did. As they governed, they realized the importance of the U.S.Japan alliance in light of the increasing regional threats but also in light of the
more traditional disputes. Reality was very different fiÿom what the DPJ imagined
it to be.

Japan's security policy in most of its post-war years engaged in
international security only through its alliance with the United States. But with the
changing security environment near and far, Japanese leaders sought to expand

their engagement and created a role for the country within the fi'amework of the
existing peace constitution. Japan may not be a 'traditional' great power but it has

been searching for a way to play an appropriate role in the management of
international security by increasing its participation in peacekeeping missions, as
set out in Ozawa's internationalist concept. Ozawa also emphasized the

maintenance of close cooperative ties with the United States in order to foster
regional security in Asia. Whether or not the DPJ leaders intended to keep the
alliance strong or not, it has been sustained because of the threats Japan and the
world faces today.
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